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QU0 WARRANTO IN MISSOURI
I. INTRODUCTION
Quo warranto is a proceeding in which the state determines the legal-
ity of a party's claim to a public office or franchise.1 It is applied
principally in two types of cases: suits to try a person's title to office2
and litigation seeking to revoke a corporate charter. 3 The standard
remedy in suits brought upon a writ of quo warranto is ouster, al-
though in some situations a fine is imposed. This note contains a
brief historical description of quo warranto, an explanation of some
of its attributes as used in Missouri, and a more detailed analysis of the
two classic applications of the writ.
In England quo warranto was originally a writ of right4 for the
Crown to determine the authority upon which one who claimed an of-
fice, franchise, or liberty of the Crown supported his claim.5 If the
claimant could not show his right to the office or franchise, it was
forfeited to the Crown. Since the original writ was a lengthy process
and a judgment on the writ was conclusive even against the Crown,
it fell into gradual disuse. A speedier and less conclusive informa-
tion0 in the nature of quo warranto developed; its purpose was identical
to the older writ. Originally these informations were considered crim-
inal in nature, but gradually came to be recognized as civil proceed-
1. F. FERIS, EXTRAORDINARY LEGAL REEEs § 101 (1926).
See State ex rel. McKittrick v. Murphy, 347 Mo. 484, 148 S.W.2d 527 (1941),
for a discussion of the term "franchise." "A franchise has been defined as 'A special
privilege conferred by government on individuals, and which does not belong to the
citizens of the country generally by common right.' The term is applied by the
courts to the powers granted by law to public officers and agencies of government."
Id. at 490, 148 S.W.2d at 530. In State ex reL Wear v. Business Men's Athletic
Club, 178 Mo. App. 548, 163 S.W. 901 (1914), the court said, "The corporate fran-
chise is the right to exist as an entity for the purpose of doing things which are per-
mitted under the law authorizing the incorporation." Id. at 560, 163 S.W. at 907.
2. F. Fmuts, supra note 1, at § 145.
3. Id. at § 140.
4. The Crown Attorney was not required to obtain leave of court to file the writ,
and the determination of ouster was a matter solely for the king. Id. at § 105.
5. The history in this paragraph is based on the text in I. HiGH, ExrRAoRDINARY
LEGAL REMEDIES §§ 591-603 (3d ed. 1896).
6. An information is defined as an accusation or complaint against a person for
some criminal offense and differs principally from an indictment in that the latter
rests on the accusation of a grand jury, whereas the former is grounded on the alle-
gation of the officer who exhibits it. Originally an information in the nature of quo
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ings. Before the Statute of Anne,' these informations could be filed
only by the attorney general on behalf of the Crown and could not be
used by private individuals to test the title of a person claiming a public
office or franchise. The statute allowed the filing of an information
by the Crown's attorney general upon the relation of any person desir-
ig to prosecute a quo warranto inquiry. Unlike the common law in-
formation, leave of court was required to file statutory quo warranto.
11. CURRENT STATUS OF Quo WARRANTO IN IISSOURI
As in England, two types of informations in the nature of quo war-
ranto are recognized in Missouri:8 those filed pursuant to statute by
the government attorney at the instance of a private relator; and those
filed ex officio by a government attorney on his own initiative.0 Both
are civil proceedings at law"0 and are governed by the regular rules of
pleading and civil procedure.'1
warranto was a special form of criminal information, but, as stated in the text, it is
now a civil proceeding to try the right of a party to a public office or franchise. 5
M. BACON, ABRIDGMENT OF THE LAw 169-73 (with American notes and references
by J. Bouvier 1856). See State v. St. Louis Perpetual Marine, Fire & Life Ins. Co., 8
Mo. 330 (1843).
7. 9 Anne c. 20 (1710).
8. In State v. St. Louis Perpetual Marine, Fire & Life Ins. Co., 8 Mo. 330 (1843),
the supreme court held that the writ of quo warranto was still to be distinguished from
the modem information in the nature of quo warranto and that both were still in use
in Missouri. Subsequent cases, however, held that, the ancient writ having become
obsolete before Missouri achieved statehood, the reference in the Missouri constitu-
tion to original remedial writs was to the more modem informations and not the
ancient writ, though the term "writ" is still used to refer to the information. See
State ex rel. Hadley v. Standard Oil Co., 218 Mo. 1, 116 S.W. 902, 1018 (1909); State
ex rel. Walker v. Equitable Loan & Inv. Ass'n, 142 Mo. 325, 41 S.W. 916 (1897).
9. Both the attorney general and a prosecuting attorney may file these, infor-
mations, but a prosecuting attorney does not have authority equal to that of the at-
torney general. He is limited to cases specially affecting his county. See State ex rel.
Schneider's Credit Jewelers, Inc. v. Brackman, 272 S.W.2d 289 (Mo. 1954), in which
the court held that a prosecuting attorney may not file quo warranto to oust a corpora-
tion authorized to do business statewide.
10. State ex rel. McNutt v. Northup, 367 S.W.2d 512 (Mo. 1963); State ex rel.
Killam v. Consolidated School Dist., 277 Mo. 458, 209 S.W. 938 (1919); State ex rel.
Walker v. Equitable Loan & Inv. Ass'n, 142 Mo. 325, 41 S.W. 916 (1897); State
ex rel Attorney General v. Vail, 53 Mo. 97 (1873); State ex rel. Bornefeld v. Kup-
ferle, 44 Mo. 154 (1869); State ex reL Brison v. Lingo, 26 Mo. 496 (1858).
11. A quo warranto action is initiated by the filing of an information containing
the relator's name. The court then requires the defendant to appear and answer. If a
private person desires to initiate proceedings, he must first contact the attorney gen-
eral or prosecuting attorney and request permission to bring action. The regular
rules of civil procedure govern suits filed in circuit court. If the action is originally
filed in appellate court, Rules 84.22-84.25 of the Missouri Rules of Civil Procedure
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Initially the circuit courts of Missouri exercised common law juris-
diction over ex officio informations, 2 but in 1945 they were granted
constitutional jurisdiction. 13  The circuit courts have statutory juris-
diction of quo warranto actions brought under the Missouri statute
governing suits at the relation of private persons. 4
The Missouri Supreme Court and the state courts of appeal also are
granted original jurisdiction to issue writs of quo warranto under the
state constitution. 15 Constitutionally authorized jurisdiction over ex
officio informations was never seriously questioned; but the supreme
court, in State ex rel. McIlhaney v. Stewart,", expressed doubt whether
the constitution referred to original informations at the relation of a
private individual. The statute governing suits of this nature confers
jurisdiction in these cases upon the circuit courts and "other courts
having concurrent jurisdiction therewith in civil cases."'1 7  In a case
which did not directly present the question of jurisdiction, the court
interpreted the above language to include the supreme court.'8 Other
are controlling. Rule 84.24 requires that the opposing party be given five days notice
before the writ issues. There is, however, a provision for waiver of notice if it would
defeat the purpose of the writ.
An information seeking the ouster of a public official must contain the name of the
person holding the office in question and a general allegation that he holds the office
without lawful authority. If the information seeks ouster of a corporation, it must
contain the name of the corporation (if original incorporation is attacked, the infor-
mation should be directed at the individuals purporting to act as a corporation) and
the specific acts or omissions producing forfeiture of the corporation's charter. In
both cases, if there is a private relator, his name and special interest must be alleged
in the information. The answer is prepared as in other civil cases. It should set out
all affirmative defenses including an allegation of facts sufficient to demonstrate de-
fendant's legal right to the office or franchise in question. MoBARCLE, Missouru
APPELLATE PRACTICE & PROCEDtURE AND ExT"RAoRDInAY RFMEDmES §§ 916-24 (1963);
M. VoLz, J. LOGAN & C. BLACKMAR, 2 MISSOURI PRACTICE, METHODS OF PRACTICE
§§ 2022-25 (1961); C. WHEATON & C. BLACKMAR, 10 MISSOURiu PRACTICE, PROCEDURAL
FORMS 548-67 (1962).
12. State ex rel. Norman v. Ellis, 325 Mo. 154, 28 S.W.2d 363 (1930); State ex
rel Kimbrell v. People's Ice, Storage & Fuel Co., 246 Mo. 168, 151 S.W. 101 (1912);
State ex rel. McIlhaney v. Stewart, 32 Mo. 379 (1862).
13. Mo. CONST. art. V, § 4.
14. Mo. REv. STAT. §§ 531.010 to 531.060 (1969); Mo. R. Civ. P. 98.
15. Mo. CONST. art. V, § 4:
Superintending control of superior over inferior courts-original remedial
writs. The supreme court, courts of appeals, and circuit courts shall have a
general superintending control over all inferior courts and tribunals in their
jurisdiction, and may issue and determine original remedial writs.
16. 32 Mo. 379 (1862).
17. Mo. Rv. STAT. § 531.010 (1969).
18. State ex rel. Norman v. Ellis, 252 Mo. 154, 28 S.W.2d 363 (1930).
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cases indicate that the statute refers only to the circuit courts and does
not authorize the supreme court to exercise original jurisdiction.1 9 De-
spite hesitation in Stewart and despite the lack of an explicit statutory
grant of jurisdiction, the supreme court has claimed constitutional au-
thority over these informations,2" but since it is easier to try issues of
fact in a circuit court, the supreme court has often declined to exercise
its jurisdiction.21 If it does accept jurisdiction, the court may appoint
a commissioner to make findings of fact,22 but his conclusions are only
advisory and not binding upon the court.2
The courts of appeal have general appellate jurisdiction over quo
warranto actions except for those over which the supreme court has
exclusive appellate jurisdiction by article five section three of the con-
stitution. 24  The latter cases include suits which involve title to state
offices. For purposes of appellate jurisdiction, city offices are not
considered "offices under this state. ' 25  Although an early constitu-
tional provision granted the supreme court exclusive appellate jurisdic-
tion when "any state officer as such is a party" to the suit, the supreme
court held that it did not have exclusive appellate jurisdiction of quo
warranto suits at the relation of a private person.20 The private party,
not the government attorney, was deemed the real party in interest.
19. E.g., State ex rel. Mcllhaney v. Stewart, 32 Mo. 379 (1862); State ex rel,
Lawrence v. Balcom, 71 Mo. App. 27 (1897).
20. State ex rel. Attorney General v. Claggett, 73 Mo. 388 (1881); State ex rel.
Young v. Buskirk, 43 Mo. 111 (1868); State ex rel. Lawrence v. Balcom, 71 Mo. App.
27 (1897).
21. E.g., State ex rel. Young v. Buskirk, 43 Mo. 111 (1868); State ex rel. He-
quembourg v. Lawrence, 38 Mo. 535 (1866).
22. E.g., State ex rel. Otto v. Kansas City College of Medicine & Surgery, 315
Mo. 101, 285 S.W. 980 (1926).
23. State ex rel. Eagleton v. Elliott, 380 S.W.2d 929 (Mo. 1964); State ex rel.
Miller v. St. Louis Union Trust Co., 335 Mo. 845, 74 S.W.2d 348 (1934); State ex
rel. Union Elec. Light & Power Co. v. Grimm, 220 Mo. 483, 119 S.W. 626 (1909).'
24. Mo. CONsT. art. V, § 3:
Jurisdiction of the supreme court. The supreme court shall have exclusive
appellate jurisdiction in all cases involving the construction of the Constitu-
tion of the United States or of this state, ...the title to any office under
this state, . . . and except as provided in this section, in other classes of
cases provided by supreme court rule unless otherwise changed by law. The
court of appeals shall have general appellate jurisdiction in all cases except
those within the exclusive jurisdiction of the supreme court.
25. State ex rel. Tucker v. Mattingly, 268 S.W.2d 868 (Mo. 1954); State ex
rel. Ragsdale v. Walker, 132 Mo. 210, 33 S.W. 813 (1896). It must be emphasized
that this is only a question of jurisdiction and that quo warranto is the proper rem.
edy to oust city officeholders from office, see note 102 infra and accompanying text.
26. State ex rel. Tucker v. Mattingly, 268 S.W.2d 868 (Mo. 1954).
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Whatever confusion existed was resolved by an amendment to section
three of article five removing cases involving state officers from the
supreme court's exclusive appellate jurisdiction. 27
The judgment in quo warranto cases is within the discretion of the
court. The standard judgment is ouster, but courts are reluctant to
grant ouster unless it will serve a public purpose.28 In suits against
both public officials29 and corporations,30 the judgment may be partial
ouster-the officer or corporation may be ordered to cease exercising
particular usurped powers while otherwise allowed to retain office or
corporate charter. In addition to ouster, the court may impose a fine if
there is a finding of evil intent or improper motive,3' or the court may
choose merely to impose a fine and condition ouster upon failure to
pay.12 The amount of the fine is commensurate with the seriousness
of the transgression.3 3
Quo warranto informations at the relation of a private individual must
be filed pursuant to statute.34 The private relator is required to obtain
approval of the government attorney to maintain a quo warranto pro-
ceeding,35 such approval being completely discretionary.3" Unlike ex
27. See note 24 supra.
28. State ex rel. City of Lebanon v. Missouri Standard Tel. Co., 337 Mo. 642,
85 S.W.2d 613 (1935); State ex rel. Harrington v. School Dist., 314 Mo. 315, 284
S.W. 135 (1926); State ex rel. Crain v. Baker, 104 S.W.2d 726 (Mo. App. 1937).
29. State ex rel. McKittrick v. Murphy, 347 Mo. 484, 148 S.W.2d 527 (1941).
Here officers of the Unemployment Commission were ousted "from locating or attempt-
ing to locate the central office of the Commission outside the City of Jefferson." Id.
at 493, 148 S.W.2d at 532.
30. State ex rel. McKittrick v. C.S. Dudley & Co., 340 Mo. 852, 102 S.W.2d 895
(1937). In this case a corporation chartered as a general collection business was or-
dered to refrain from the illegal practice of law but was otherwise allowed to retain
its charter "and conduct its business according to law on penalty of the forfeiture of
its charter and franchise." Id. at 865, 102 S.W.2d at 903. See also State ex rel. Mc-
Kittrick v. American Colony Ins. Co., 336 Mo. 406, 80 S.W.2d 876 (1934).
31. State ex rel. Taylor v. Salary Purchasing Co., 358 Mo. 1022, 218 S.W.2d 571
(1949); State v. McBride, 4 Mo. 303 (1836).
32. State ex rel. Miller v. Mercantile-Commerce Bank & Trust Co., 335 Mo. 873,
74 S.W.2d 362 (1934).
33. State ex rel. Dalton v. Riss & Co., 335 S.W.2d 116 (Mo. 1960), appeal dis-
missed, 364 U.S. 338 (1960).
34. Mo. Rav. STAT. §§ 531.010 to 531.060 (1969); Mo. R. Civ. P. 98. The
statute of Anne was never part of Missouri common law though it was virtually
copied by the legislature as early as 1825. See State ex rel. Mcflhaney v. Stewart,
32 Mo. 379 (1862).
35. State ex rel. Black v. Taylor, 208 Mo. 442, 106 S.W. 1023 (1907); State
ex rel. Smith v. Gardner, 204 S.W.2d 319 (Mo. App. 1947). See also Spiking
Washington University Open Scholarship
756 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 1972:751
officio proceedings, the government attorney must obtain leave of
court. 7 Once the proceeding is commenced, however, it is essentially
in the control of the private relator and may not be discontinued with-
out his permission. 8 The private relator is also required to have a
special interest in the subject matter of the proceeding89  Although it
is not completely clear what constitutes the requisite special interest,
a rival claimant to a public office has sufficient interest to serve as
relator in a suit to challenge a person's title to that office;40 residents
of a municipality have the requisite interest to attack a municipality's
corporate existence;41 and taxpayers have sufficient interest to attack
the existence of a taxing agency such as a school district.42  Taxpayer
status, however, does not confer the requisite interest to challenge a
School Dist. v. Purported "Enlarged School Dist.," 362 Mo. 848, 245 S.W.2d 13
(1952).
36. State ex rel. Clare v. Consolidated School Dist., 277 Mo. 458, 209 S.W. 938
(1919); State ex rel. Black v. Taylor, 208 Mo. 442, 106 S.W. 1023 (1907).
37. State ex rel. City of Campbell v. Arkansas-Missouri Power Co., 339 Mo. 15,
93 S.W.2d 887 (1936); State ex rel. Berkley v. McClain, 187 Mo. 409, 86 S.W. 135(1905); State ex rel. Attorney General v. Balcom, 71 Mo. App. 27 (1897).
38. State ex rel. Clare v. Consolidated School Dist., 277 Mo. 458, 209 S.W. 938
(1919); State ex rel. Perkins v. Long, 275 Mo. 169, 204 S.W. 914 (1918); State ex
rel. Black v. Taylor, 208 Mo. 442, 106 S.W. 1023 (1907).
39. State ex rel. Clare v. Consolidated School Dist., 277 Mo. 458, 209 S.W. 938(1919); State ex rel. Dearing v. Berkley, 148 Mo. 184, 41 S.W. 732 (1897) (dictum);
State ex rel. Schneider's Credit Jewelers, Inc. v. Brackman, 260 S.W.2d 800 (Mo.
App. 1953); State ex rel. White v. Small, 131 Mo. App. 470, 109 S.W. 1079 (1908).
See State ex rel. Patterson v. Ferguson, 333 Mo. 117, 65 S.W.2d 97 (1933), cert.
denied, 291 U.S. 682 (1934), for a case holding that an information may state a valid
cause of action despite failure to aver the relator's special interest. Failure to satisfy
the special interest requirement was not fatal. The court treated the information as
actually filed by the government attorney, ex officio, for the protection of the public
interest. The designation of private relators was treated as surplusage. Ferguson was
'a case seeking ouster of a city mayor submitted to the supreme court by stipulation of
the parties. The court failed to indicate what would be required to save such an infor-
mation from dismissal other than it appeared to be brought by the government attor-
ney for the protection of the public interest; since all quo warranto suits are for the pro-
tection of the public interest, carried to its logical extreme, this reasoning would
seem to abrogate the special interest Tequirement. This rationale has not been ex-
pressed in any other Missouri decision.
40. See State ex rel. Attorney General v. Claggett, 73 Mo. 388 (1881); State
ex rel. Attorney General v. Balcom, 71 Mo. App. 27 (1897).
41. State ex rel. Tucker v. Mattingly, 268 S.W.2d 868 (Mo. 1954).
42. State ex rel. Marbut v. Potter, 191 S.W. 57 (Mo. 1916); State ex rel. Berkley
v. McClain, 187 Mo. 409, 86 S.W. 135 (1905); State ex rel. White v. Small, 131 Mo.
App. 470, 109 S.W. 1079 (1908). See note 94 infra and accompanying text for a
more detailed discussion of the special interest requirement as it relates to suits trying
title to office.
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public official's right to office.43 This result has been justified as pre-
venting unnecessary harassment of public officials,44 though arguably
such abuse could be avoided by careful screening by the government
attorney.
Corporations
Quo warranto is the proper method in Missouri to oust a private cor-
poration from its corporate franchise and privileges. 45  It may be used
against domestic corporations and foreign corporations licensed to do
business in Missouri.40  A corporation may be ousted on grounds of
invalid incorporation4 7 or abuse of corporate charter.48  In the latter
instance the charter is forfeited on the theory that the corporation, by
abusing its charter, violates an implied contract with the state to adhere
to the state's laws and the purposes for which the corporation was or-
ganized. 0
Quo warranto is the exclusive method to determine the validity of a
municipal corporation'0 and may be used to challenge the original in-
corporation,"' an extension of boundaries,52 or both in the same pro-
43. See State ex rel. Pickett v. Cairns, 305 Mo. 333, 265 S.W. 527 (1924).
44. See State ex rel. Pickett v. Cairns, 305 Mo. 333, 265 S.W. 527 (1924); State
ex rel. Thompson v. Heffernan, 243 Mo. 442, 148 S.W. 90 (1912).
45. E.g., State ex rel. Hadley v. Delmar Jockey Club, 200 Mo. 34, 92 S.W. 185
(1905), appeal dismissed, 210 U.S. 324 (1908); State ex rel. Wear v. Business Men's
Athletic Club, 178 Mo. App. 548, 163 S.W. 901 (1914).
46. State ex rel. Dalton v. Riss & Co., 335 S.W.2d 118 (1960); State ex rel. Taylor
v. America Ins. Co., 355 Mo. 1053, 200 S.W.2d 1 (1947).
47. See State ex rel. McKittrick v. Koon, 356 Mo. 284, 201 S.W.2d 446 (Mo.
1947); State ex rel. Clements v. Clardy, 267 Mo. 371, 185 S.W. 184 (1916); State
ex rel. Beach v. Citizens Benefit Ass'n, 6 Mo. App. 163 (1878).
48. State ex rel. Barker v. Armour Packing Co., 265 Mo. 121, 176 S.W. 382
(1915), appeal dismissed, 242 U.S. 663 (1916); State ex rel. Attorney General v. Ar-
kansas Lumber Co., 260 Mo. 212, 169 S.W. 145 (1914); State ex rel. Hadley v. Del-
mar Jockey Club, 200 Mo. 34, 92 S.W. 185 (1905).
49. State ex rel. Hadley v. Delmar Jockey Club, 200 Mo. 34, 92 S.W. 185 (1905).
50. E.g., State ex rel. Eagleton v. Champ, 393 S.W.2d 516 (Mo. 1965); State ex
rel. Taylor v. Cumpton, 362 Mo. 199, 240 S.W.2d 877 (1951); State ex rel. Tucker
v. Mattingly, 275 S.W.2d 34 (Mo. App. 1955); State ex rel. Jackson v. Town of
Mansfield, 99 Mo. App. 146, 72 S.W. 471 (1903). Willful misconduct by a public
official results in automatic forfeiture and ouster. State ex rel. Dalton v. Mosley,
36 Mo. 711, 286 S.W.2d 721 (1956).
51. State ex rel. Meriwether v. Campbell, 120 Mo. 396, 25 S.W. 392 (1894);
State ex rel. Brown v. Town of Westport, 116 Mo. 582, 22 S.W. 888 (1893); State
ex rel. Ryan v. Huffman, 248 S.W. 985 (Mo. App. 1923).
52. State ex rel. Womack v. City of Joplin, 332 Mo. 1193, 62 S.W.2d 393 (1933);
State ex rel. Mayor, Council, & Citizens of Liberty v. City of Pleasant Valley, 453
S.W.2d 700 (Mo. App. 1970).
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ceeding. 53  If an annexation is being challenged, the municipality is a
necessary party. 4 Formerly this prohibited attacking annexation and
original incorporation in the same proceeding on the theory that the
presence of the municipality as a party in the annexation count admitted
its valid existence, which was being attacked in the other count," but
the supreme court has rejected this reasoning.60  Since alternative
pleadings are allowed by liberalized procedural rules, there is no logic
in requiring separate proceedings to challenge incorporation and annex-
ation. This rationale would also apply to suits against private corpo-
rations in which the relator wishes to contest both the original incorpo-
ration and the exercise of particular powers.
The validity and composition of a school district can be challenged
by quo warrantor and this is the only means for residents and taxpay-
ers of a district to do so, since they are not permitted to attack its ex-
istence by a declaratory judgment action. 58  The same rule applies
when the school district is seeking to acquire jurisdiction over addi-
tional territory.59 In a jurisdictional dispute between two school dis-
tricts over certain territory, however, either quo warranto10 (with one
district serving as relator) or a declaratory judgment action 1 is proper
53. State ex reL Eagleton v. Champ, 393 S.W.2d 516 (Mo. 1965).
54. Id. at 530.
55. State ex tel. Crow v. Fleming, 158 Mo. 558, 595 S.W. 118 (1900).
56. State ex rel. Eagleton v. Champ, 393 S.W.2d 516 (Mo. 1965). State ex tel.
Brown v. Town of Westport, 116 Mo. 582, 22 S.W. 888 (1893), involved a challenge
to incorporation and extension in the same proceeding. The court allowed the suit
but failed to discuss the problem involved in Champ.
57. E.g., State ex rel. Borgelt v. Pretended Consolidated School Dist., 362 Mo. 249,
240 S.W.2d 946 (1951); State ex rel. Berkley v. McClain, 187 Mo. 409, 86 S.W. 135
(1905).
58. State ex tel. Junior College Dist. v. Barker, 418 S.W.2d 62 (Mo. 1967); Utt v.
Oster, 362 Mo. 866, 245 S.W.2d 22 (1952); Spiking School Dist. v. Purported "En-
larged School Dist.," 362 Mo. 848, 245 S.W.2d 13 (1952). In Watts v. Gross, 468
S.W.2d 223 (Mo. 1971), however, landowners were allowed to attack the existence
of a county levee district. The articles of association contained a fifty year limitation
and the court held that the district ceased to exist by operation of law at the expira-
tion of that period. The court reasoned that, the cessation appearing on the face of
the record, the district had no de facto existence and could therefore be attacked by
private citizens.
59. State ex tel Junior College Dist. v. Barker, 418 S.W.2d 62 (Mo. 1967); Utt
v. Oster, 362 Mo. 866, 245 S.W.2d 22 (1952); Lane v. Finney, 274 S.W.2d 521 (Mo.
App. 1955); Schmidt v. Goshen School Dist., 250 S.W.2d 834 (Mo. App. 1952).
60. State v. Eckley, 347 S.W.2d 704 (Mo. 1961); State ex rel. Dalton v. Re-
organized Dist., 307 S.W.2d 501 (Mo. 1957); State ex tel. Oster v. Hill, 262 S.W.2d
581 (Mo. 1953).
61. Reorganized School Dist. R-1 v. Reorganized School Dist. R-111, 360 S.W.2d
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to determine the boundaries of the two districts. The purpose for dis-
allowing private individuals to question the validity of a school district
by a declaratory judgment action is to avoid harassment and promote
stability.62 The threat of harassment is not present when two districts
are involved and, since both have sufficient interest in the outcome,
the declaratory judgment action is appropriate. 63
In challenging the legal existence of a municipal corporation or spe-
cial district it is important to note that quo warranto is not a substitute
for an appeal. 6 The actions of a county court incorporating a mu-
nicipality are judicial in nature, and errors of such a body as to fact
or law are not fatal to the finality of its order of incorporation. Such
an order is a final judgment of a court of record; legal and factual er-
rors are matters to be determined on appeal and are not reviewable in
a quo warranto proceeding. 65 Thus, if incorporation decrees of a
county court are challenged by quo warranto, fraud or non-compliance
with the statutes governing the issuances of such decree must be al-
leged."'
When quo warranto is used to challenge the original incorporation
of either a public or private corporation, the suit must be directed
against the individuals who have allegedly usurped corporate priv-
ileges. 17  If abuse of corporate charter is alleged, the corporation itself
is the proper party. 8
Though a single unlawful act by a corporation may result in for-
376 (Mo. App. 1962). See also State ex rel. Burns v. Johnston, 249 S.W.2d 357 (Mo.
1952).
62. Walker Reorganized School Dist. v. Flint, 303 S.W.2d 200 (Mo. App. 1957).
63. Id. at 206.
64. State ex rel. Cook v. Dougan, 305 Mo. 383, 264 S.W. 997 (1924); State ex reL
Cole v. Norborne Land Drainage Dist. Co., 290 Mo. 91, 234 S.W. 344 (1921);
State ex rel. Crow v. Fleming, 158 Mo. 558, 59 S.W. 118 (1900).
65. See cases cited note 64 supra.
66. State ex rel. Eagleton v. Champ, 393 S.W.2d 516 (Mo. 1963); State ex rel.
Cook v. Dougan, 305 Mo. 383, 264 S.W. 997 (1924); State ex rel. Cole v. Norborne
Land Drainage Dist. Co., 290 Mo. 91, 234 S.W. 344 (1921); State ex rel. Crow v.
Fleming, 158 Mo. 558, 59 S.W. 118 (1900). For a case in which an incorporation
decree was set aside on the basis of fraud, see State ex rel. Major v. Wood, 233 Mo. 357,
135 S.W. 932 (1911).
67. State ex reL Gentry v. Monarch Transfer & Storage Co., 20 S.W.2d 601 (Mo.
1926); State ex rel. Berkley v. McClain, 187 Mo. 409, 86 S.W. 135 (1905); State ex
rel. Crow v. Fleming, 147 Mo. 1, 44 S.W. 758 (1898); State ex rel. Meriwether v.
Campbell, 120 Mo. 396, 25 S.W. 392 (1894).
68. State ex rel. Wear v. Business Men's Athletic Club, 178 Mo. App. 548, 163
S.W. 901 (1914).
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feiture,6 9 not every abuse will produce this result. The abuse of charter
must affect the public interest to constitute grounds for forfeiture.70
There are no precise standards by which to judge whether the public
interest is sufficiently affected to justify forfeiture. The courts have
articulated only general guidelines, e.g., to produce forfeiture -an act
must concern "matters which are of the essence of the contract between
the state and the corporation."'71  Consequently, the issue has been
resolved on a case by case basis. 72  Since quo warranto actions against
municipal and public service corporations have centered on the validity
of original incorporation or expiration of franchise, not abuse of pow-
ers,73 the question of which acts result in forfeiture has only arisen in
suits against private corporations.
Courts have often applied the doctrines of laches and estoppel in
suits against municipal corporations. 74  Generally, Missouri cases ex-
press a reluctance to grant ouster if it will adversely affect the public
peace, security of property, or payment of the city's debts. 71 It is
69. State ex rel McKittrick v. American Ins. Co., 346 Mo. 269, 140 S.W.2d
36 (1940).
70. State ex rel Gentry v. American Can Co., 319 Mo. 456, 4 S.W.2d 448 (1928);
State ex rel. Hadley v. Delmar Jockey Club, 200 Mo. 34, 98 S.W. 542 (1905).
71. State ex rel. Hadley v. Delmar Jockey Club, 200 Mo. 34, 68, 98 S.W. 542, 555
(1905).
72. State ex rel. McKittrick v. American Colony Ins. Co., 336 Mo. 406, 80
S.W.2d 876 (1935) (increase of rates by fire insurance companies without approval
of superintendant of insurance a matter of public interest); State ex rel. Gentry
v. American Can Co., 319 Mo. 456, 4 S.W.2d 448 (1928) (manufacturer of cans hold-
ing onto corporate name solely to prevent its use by anyone else and not for purpose
of operating under it affects the public interest); State ex reL. Hadley v. Standard
Oil Co., 218 Mo. 1, 116 S.W. 902 (1909) (public interested in actions which are in re-
straint of trade); State ex rel. Barret v. First Nat'l Bank, 297 Mo. 397, 249 S.W.
619 (1923), aff'd sub nom. First Nat'l Bank v. Missouri, 263 U.S. 640 (attempt by a
national bank to establish a branch bank in violation of a state law a matter of pub-
lic interest); State ex rel. Hadley v. Delmar Jockey Club, 200 Mo. 34, 98 S.W. 542
(1905) (failure to give exhibitions of agricultural products and contests of speed in
races between horses according to charter affects public interest); State ex rel. Crow v.
Atchison, T. & S. R.R., 176 Mo. 687, 75 S.W. 776 (1903) (imposition of reconsign-
ment charge by a railroad for transportation of cars of grain from place of original
delivery to another location within a city a matter of purely private concern).
73. See cases cited notes 74-82 infra and accompanying text.
74. E.g., State ex rel. Eagleton v. Champ, 393 S.W.2d 516 (Mo. 1965); State
ex rel. Crain v. Baker, 104 S.W.2d 726 (Mo. 1937). See also State ex rel. Harrington
v. School Dist., 314 Mo. 315, 284 S.W. 135 (1926); State ex rel. Clare v. Con-
solidated School Dist., 277 Mo. 458, 209 S.W. 938 (1919), for cases applying laches
in suits against school districts.
75. State ex rel. Deal & Co. v. Stanwood, 208 S.W.2d 291 (Mo. App. 1948);
Central Missouri Oil Co. v. City of St. James, 232 Mo. App. 142, 111 S.W.2d 215
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1972/iss4/5
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feared that otherwise a city will be unable to obtain credit, i.e. in-
vestors will not buy municipal securities for fear of the city's dissolu-
tion. Laches has been used to deny ouster when the attack was made
eight,76 ten,'77 and twelve78 years after incorporation. On the other
hand, mere passage of time will not necessarily result in denial of
ouster. Applying the same general considerations, ouster has been
granted when the citizens have never unanimously accepted the validity
of the corporation, some have never paid taxes, and no obligations
have been assumed by the village. 79  Thus, neither private rights nor
the public interest was adversely affected by ouster.
Laches has also been applied in suits to expel electric companies
from municipalities on grounds that their franchises have expired.80
If the equities are in favor of the power company, its private rights
override the public rights of the municipality. A passage of nine years
after expiration of an electric company's franchise, during which time
electric service was furnished without objection from the city, is suffi-
cient reason to deny ouster.8 ' Payment of property, sales, and license
taxes are factors in the company's favor, but the license tax may be
the crucial factor since imposition of other taxes is not considered an
admission that the company is lawfully constituted. 2 It is significant,
though, that this distinction was made in a case in which there was
strong opposition to the company in the city council throughout the pe-
riod following expiration of its franchise. It is thus open to question
whether the distinction between general and license taxes would be
controlling if such continuing opposition is not present.
Title to Office
Title to public offices"' and offices in private corporations 4 are tri-
(1938); State ex reL Jackson v. Town of Mansfield, 99 Mo. App. 146, 72 S.W. 471
(1903).
76. State ex rel. Jackson v. Town of Mansfield, 99 Mo. App. 146, 72 S.W. 471
(1903).
77. State ex rel. Deal & Co. v. Stanwood, 208 S.W.2d 291 (Mo. App. 1948).
78. State ex rel. Brown v. Town of Westport, 116 Mo. 582, 22 S.W. 888 (1893).
79. State ex rel. Bales v. Hyde, 2 S.W.2d 212 (Mo. App. 1928).
80. State ex reL Sikeston v. Missouri Util. Co., 331 Mo. 337, 53 S.W.2d 394 (1932).
81. Id.
82. State ex rel. California v. Missouri Util. Co., 339 Mo. 385, 96 S.W.2d 607
(1936).
83. See State ex rel. Walker v. Bus, 135 Mo. 325, 331, 36 S.W. 366, 367 (1896), for
the following definition of a public office: "A public office is defined as 'the right, au-
thority, and duty, created and conferred by law, by which, for a given period, either
fixed by law or enduring at the pleasure of the creating power, an individual is in-
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able in a quo warranto proceeding, 85 the information being directed at
the purported office holder and not the office itself.86 A party may be
ousted as a usurper because of his ineligibility to hold office at the
time of his election 87 or because of his misconduct resulting in for-
feiture of office.88 Although the doctrine of laches applies in suits
attacking the validity of incorporation decrees and in cases involving
ouster of public utilities, the supreme court in State ex rel. Danforth
v. Orton89 held that laches will not bar a suit seeking ouster of an offi-
cial for misconduct in office, since the nature of the proceeding and
the public interest preclude its application in such situations. The
narrow holding of Orton is limited to instances of misconduct in office
and would not seem to apply to ouster suits at the relation of a rival
claimant alleging ineligibility of the incumbent, since the public interest
is arguably not as great in such suits.
Quo warranto filed ex officio by the government attorney determines
only the respondent's legal title to office90 and has no effect on the
claims of others to the same office. Early Missouri cases, however,
manifested some confusion concerning the nature and scope of the
proceeding if the information was brought at the relation of a private
party. There was early authority that a rival claimant serving as relator
must show in the information that he possesses all the necessary quali-
fications for office.9 This holding was seemingly based on the ra-
vested with some portion of the sovereign functions of the government, to be exercised
by him for the benefit of the public.' [Citations omitted.] The individual who is in-
vested with authority, and is required to perform the duties, is a public officer."
84. See State ex rel. Bornefeld v. Kupferle, 44 Mo. 154 (1869).
85. E.g., State ex rel. Danforth v. Orton, 465 S.W.2d 618 (Mo. 1971); State ex
rel. McKittrick v. Murphy, 347 Mo. 484, 148 S.W.2d 527 (1941); State ex rel. Mc-
Kittrick v. Wymore, 345 Mo. 169, 132 S.W.2d 979 (1939).
86. State ex reL. McKittrick v. Murphy, 347 Mo. 484, 148 S.W.2d 527 (1941);
State ex rel. Byrd v. Knott, 75 S.W.2d 86 (Mo. 1934).
Quo warranto does not lie to prevent the improper exercise of power lawfully
possessed but only to prevent the usurpation of power not possessed. See State ex rel.
McKittrick v. Murphy, 347 Mo. 484, 148 S.W.2d 527 (1941); State ex rel. Walsh
v. Thatcher, 340 Mo. 865, 102 S.W.2d 937 (1937).
87. E.g., State ex rel. Crow v. Page, 140 Mo. 501, 41 S.W. 963 (1897).
88. E.g., State ex rel. Saunders v. Borgess, 346 Mo. 548, 264 S.W.2d 339 (1954);
State ex rel. McKittrick v. Wymore, 345 Mo. 169, 132 S.W.2d 979 (1939).
89. 465 S.W.2d 618 (Mo. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 852 (1972).
90. State ex rel. McKittrick v. Wiley, 349 Mo. 239, 160 S.W.2d 677 (1942);
State ex rel. Attorney General v. Vail, 53 Mo. 97 (1873).
91. State ex reL. Kempf v. Boal, 46 Mo. 528 (1870). For another case indicating
that quo warranto involved seating the relator, see State ex rel. McCune v. Rails
County Court, 45 Mo. 58 (1869).
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tionale that quo warranto involved seating the relator as well as ousting
the respondent. This view has been rejected and it is now clear that
the relator need not be a claimant of the office.92 Numerous cases
state that in addition to ouster a quo warranto judgment only authorizes
costs for the relator and that he may not be seated in office via quo
warranto.
3
If the relator is not a rival claimant, however, it may be difficult to
show the necessary interest to serve as relator. As previously dis-
cussed, general taxpayer status is, without more, insufficient to create
relator status since the broad policy is to protect public officials from
unnecessary harassment. Thus, it is not certain what interest other
than that of a rival claimant would suffice in suits to try title to public
office. A stockholder, however, may have sufficient interest to attack
the validity of a claim to corporate office. 94
As stated above, recent Missouri cases indicate that the purpose of
quo warranto is to determine only the validity of respondent's title and
not that of anyone else. If a relator's interest is based upon a rival
claim to office, the claim will be examined only to the extent that it
bears upon respondent's claim to title.95 This is particularly impor-
tant if the alleged usurper is the incumbent and his eligibility for the
office is being challenged. An information brought at the relation of
a rival claimant attacking an incumbent's title to office which fails to
assert that the relator-claimant, though duly elected, had acquired
proper certification has been held to be deficient.9 6 The relator's claim
is examined and if he is not qualified, ouster is denied on the theory
that the incumbent is entitled to hold office until his successor is
elected and qualified. 7
Election contest cases must be distinguished from quo warranto pro-
ceedings. The former is the only method to oust the respondent and
seat the claimant. The sole issue in an election contest is who received
92. State ex rel. Ponath v. Hamilton, 240 S.W. 445 (Mo. 1922); State ex rel.
Weed v. Meek, 129 Mo. 431, 31 S.W. 913 (1895); State ex rel. Boyd v. Rose, 84
Mo. 198 (1884); State ex rel Ewing v. Townsley, 56 Mo. 107 (1874); State ex rel
Attorney General v. Vail, 53 Mo. 97 (1873).
93. See cases cited note 90 supra.
94. See State ex rel Attorney General v. Vail, 53 Mo. 97, 110 (1895).
95. State ex rel. McKittrick v. Wiley, 349 Mo. 239, 160 S.W.2d 677 (1942);
State ex rel. Ponath v. Hamilton, 240 S.W. 445 (Mo. 1922); State ex rel. Attorney
General v. Vail, 53 Mo. 97 (1873).
96. State ex rel. Anderson v. Moss, 187 Mo. App. 151, 172 S.W. 1180 (1915).
97. Id. at 155, 172 S.W. at 1181.
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the most votes, that is, who was actually elected. 8 The eligibility of
a successful candidate must be determined by quo warranto and is not
a proper question in an election contest case. 0 Furthermore, in con-
trast to election contests, it is improper in quo warranto proceedings
to go beyond the election returns and determine the eligibility of vot-
ers.100 Thus, as quo warranto exists in Missouri, the proceedings con-
clude upon the determination of respondent's eligibility, and inquiry
is only made into a rival claimant's title as it may affect that of re-
spondent.-01
Quo warranto lies to oust a city alderman from office despite a provi-
sion in a municipal charter stating that the board of aldermen shall
be the judge of the qualifications of its members. 10 2  The reasoning
is that such charter provisions do not attempt to vest the board with
sole power to judge the qualification of its members. Under this con-
struction the courts have avoided the question whether the people of a
city could limit the judicial power to issue quo warranto by adopting
a provision vesting exclusive authority in the board.10 3 It has been
determined, however, that the legislature can not interfere with the
courts' constitutional jurisdiction over quo warranto.10 4  In a suit to
oust the prosecuting attorney of Cole County for misconduct in office,
the court held that its jurisdiction to issue quo warranto was not af-
fected by a statute providing for the removal of county, city, and town-
ship officers. 0 5 This decision changed previous case law which held
98. Kasten v. Guth, 395 S.W.2d 433 (Mo. 1965); Davenport v. Teeters, 273 S.W.
2d 506 (Mo. App. 1954).
99. Kasten v. Guth, 395 S.W.2d 433 (Mo. 1965). Quo warranto lies only against
a person holding office. Possibly prohibition can be used to challenge, before the elec-
tion, a candidate's eligibility to run for office by questioning the placement of his
name on the ballot. See Note, The Writ of Prohibition in Missouri, 1972 WASH. U.
L. Q. 511, 530 n.94.
100. State v. Consolidated School Dist., 417 S.W.2d 657 (Mo. 1967).
101. State ex rel. Ponath v. Hamilton, 240 S.W. 445 (Mo. 1922).
102. State ex rel. Walters v. Harris, 363 S.W.2d 580 (Mo. 1962).
103. id. at 582.
104. State ex rel. McKittrick v. Wymore, 345 Mo. 169, 132 S.W.2d 979 (1939);
State ex rel. Walker v. Equitable Loan & Inv. Co., 142 Mo. 325, 41 S.W. 916 (1897);
State ex rel. Crow v. Vallins, 140 Mo. 523, 41 S.W. 887 (1897). Contra, State ex rel.
Cole v. Norborne Land Drainage Dist. Co., 290 Mo. 91, 234 S.W. 344 (1921), which in-
volved a suit to challenge the extension of boundary lines of a drainage district.
The court held that the special statutory provision which limited the scope of review in
such cases to the assessment of damages for land appropriated or adversely affected
effectively curtailed the court's power to issue quo warranto.
105. State ex rel. McKittrick v. Wymore, 343 Mo. 98, 119 S.W.2d 941 (1938).
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that a state statute calling for forfeiture of office upon conviction of a
misdemeanor precluded quo warranto proceedings without a previous
conviction."0 6 There is currently no requirement that a quo warranto
action in which forfeiture of office is alleged be preceded by a criminal
conviction, and the broader doctrine that the legislature can not inter-
fere with the courts' constitutional jurisdiction of quo warranto has been
reaffirmed.'1 7  The rationale prohibiting this legislative interference
would seem also to prevent a municipal charter from limiting the con-
stitutional power of courts to issue quo warranto.
In contrast to municipal aldermen, quo warranto does not lie to
oust a member of the House of Representatives, since a state constitu-
tional provision'"8 making the House the sole judge of its members'
qualifications precludes the use of the information. In a dispute over
the use of quo warranto to oust a state representative for failure to
satisfy a residency requirement of the state constitution, the court held
that it had jurisdiction, but granted respondent's motion to dismiss
because no justiciable issue was presented. 09 The court followed dic-
tum in Baker v. Carr"10 stating that "a textually demonstrable constitu-
tional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department" is
basis for finding non-justiciability. The rationale of this case has been
applied to forfeiture of office subsequent to valid election as well as
original ineligibility."' The supreme court noted in its most recent
decision that only a constitutional amendment, approved by the people,
could vest power in the courts to remove state legislators." 2
Ill. CONCLUSION
Quo warranto is defined as an "extraordinary writ." By its nature,
however, quo warranto is probably more extraordinary than the other
extraordinary writs-mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, and habeas
corpus. The situations calling for its application are restricted and
arise less frequently. The use of the writ is limited by its purpose-pro-
106. State ex rel. Letcher v. Dearing, 253 Mo. 604, 162 S.W. 618 (1923).
107. State ex rel. Danforth v. Orton, 465 S.W.2d 618 (Mo. 1971); State ex rel.
Dalton v. Mosely, 365 Mo. 711, 286 S.W.2d 721 (1956); State ex rel. Taylor v. Cuamp-
ton, 362 Mo. 199, 240 S.W.2d 877 (1951).
108. Mo. CONST. art. II, § 18.
109. State ex rel. Danforth v. Banks, 454 S.W.2d 498 (Mo. 1970), cert. denied,
400 U.S. 991 (1971).
110. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
111. State ex rel. Danforth v. Hickey, 475 S.W.2d 117 (Mo. 1972).
112. Id. at 622.
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tection of the public from usurpation of public office or franchise. The
limitations of this purpose are emphasized by the restrictions placed
upon the use of the writ. For instance, quo warranto is generally
brought by the government and may only be brought by a private indi-
vidual with the approval of the government attorney and with the leave
of the court. Issuance of the writ culminating in ouster of the re-
spondent from office or franchise is within the sound discretion of the
court and will be ordered only when such action is in the public interest.
Even in suits initiated by a rival claimant challenging the right of an
official to hold public office, quo warranto lies only to oust the wrong-
ful office holder, not to seat the rival. The rival's interest in attaining
office is in part his private affair and must be pursued in another pro-
ceeding.
It is possible to relax some of these restrictions and to increase the
usefulness of quo warnanto. For instance, some states allow a private
individual to bring a quo warranto action on his own initiative if the
government attorney refuses the individual's request to institute the
suit.113 Such a rule does not alter the public purpose of the writ, since
it does not change the situations to which the writ is applicable. In-
deed, making the writ more available to private individuals seems
consonant with the public interest because it imposes a check upon the
government attorney's discretionary authority. Yet Missouri has ap-
parently felt no need to expand the public's access to the writ. The
usefulness of quo warranto might also be enhanced if the courts were
to exercise more latitude in fashioning judgments. The standard judg-
ment, ouster of the respondent from office or franchise, is a rather harsh
measure and for this reason sparingly imposed. Other types of judg-
ments, however, are available, including fines and, more importantly,
ouster of the respondent from the exercise of particular powers, not from
office or franchise. The latter device could be developed into a means
of defining and enforcing limitations of powers held by public and pri-
vate corporations and officials. Still, there has been little development
during recent years in the scope and function of quo warranto in Mis-
souri, and there has been little indication of a willingness to broaden
the application of the writ in .the foreseeable future.
113. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 80.01 (Supp. 1967); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 112, § 10
(1966).
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